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Editorial
The Psychology of Forensic Evidence
Anna Sagana and Melanie Sauerland
Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University, The Netherlands
The use of forensic evidence in criminal cases is certainly
nothing new. Witness evidence and confessions are as old
as the legal system itself and the earliest application of
forensic-like techniques dates back to the ancient Greek
and Roman societies (see work of Roman jurist Quintilian,
Declamationes Maiores, 1.11–12; as cited by Killgrove,
2018). The need for forensic evidence is self-evident. For-
ensic evidence helps reconstruct the historical event, which
is the criminal act (Kiely, 2005). However, this reconstruc-
tion offers only an approximation of the true event. The
accuracy of this approximation depends on the accuracy
and reliability of the employed techniques and, ultimately,
on our understanding of the world.
Unfortunately, it is only lately that researchers have
started to investigate the (corruptive) influences of forensic
evidence and forensic science in criminal and civil investi-
gations. We now begin to realise that the collection and
interpretation of forensic evidence are susceptible to con-
textual influences and biases (Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka,
2013). Contextual influences are extraneous factors that
are irrelevant to the decision at hand because they do not
change the essence of the decision problem (Dror &
Rosenthal, 2008) and do not improve decisional accuracy.
Such extraneous factors include the context, emotional
states, and expectations. Bias occurs when the observable
result of a decision-making processes or judgement
deviates from norm or rationality (Keren & Teigen,
2004). Contextual influences and bias affect not only
so-called “soft” evidence such as forensic mental health
assessments (Neal & Grisso, 2014) and witness statements
(Ask & Granhag, 2005, 2007), but also “hard” evidence
such as fingerprints (Dror, Charlton, & Péron, 2006;
Smalarz, Madon, Yang, Guyll, & Buck, 2016) and DNA
traces (Ask, Rebelius, & Granhag, 2008).
Furthermore, it now becomes clear that not all types of
forensic evidence are equal in terms of reliability and
accuracy (Saks & Koehler, 2005). In fact, some evidence
can depreciate the evidentiary weight of subsequently
presented evidence. Confessions constitute a prime exam-
ple (Hasel & Kassin, 2009; Kassin, Bogart, & Kerner,
2012). Also in court, different types of evidence are
assigned different weights, depending on early influences
and occasionally premature interpretations. For example,
visceral reactions related to trivial changes such as the
presence of a colored or black and white crime photograph
can influence jurors’ guilty verdicts (Douglas, Lyon, &
Ogloff, 1997). Likewise, judges’ rulings in repeated sequen-
tial decisions tend to favor the status quo as time progresses
(Danziger, Levav, & Avnaim-Pesso, 2011) and often fail to
consider all relevant evidence (Dhami, 2003; Dhami,
Belton, & Goodman-Delahunty, 2015; von Helversen &
Rieskamp, 2009). Moreover, courts often overvalue the
quality of evidence (Kovera, & McAuliff, 2000; Lieberman,
Carrell, Miethe, & Krauss, 2008). For example, mock jurors
have been shown to favor a video confession over finger-
print evidence (Schweitzer & Nuñez, 2018), despite the lack
of evidence showing that confessions are more probative
than fingerprint matches.
All in all, it has become clear that the information
gathering process during the criminal investigation has a
direct impact on the nature and quality of the evidence that
is presented to prosecutors and judges. In last consequence,
that means that the challenges and failures surrounding the
collection and interpretation of evidence can shape the
future of defendants and change the lives of those who
come in contact with the legal system.
This topical issue addresses the challenges relating to the
evaluation and application of forensic evidence in criminal
proceedings. It aspires to shed light on the role and the
corruptive influences of different pieces of evidence, and
their interplay in criminal proceedings. Therefore, the arti-
cles of this issue fall into three categories:
(a) the evidentiary weight of different types of evidence,
(b) the interaction of different forms of evidence, and
(c) cognitive and behavioral changes that the knowledge of
and beliefs about such evidence might generate.
The issue of evidentiary weight of different types of evi-
dence is addressed in four papers. The special issue opens
with a review article that identifies 20 threats to the validity
of forensic source conclusions. In this article, Koehler
2020 Hogrefe Publishing Zeitschrift für Psychologie (2020), 228(3), 145–148
https://doi.org/10.1027/2151-2604/a000418
(2020) illustrates the current state of affairs in evidence
evaluation and cautions against the threats that stem from
suboptimal procedures and assessors’ cognitive confines.
Thereby, this review paper stimulates us to think about
ways to confront those threats and mitigate their negative
consequences.
The next two articles address the issue of contextual
influences on the assessment of evidence. Quigley-
McBride’s (2020) contribution represents a hands-on
approach to the problem of contextual bias in forensic evi-
dence analysis. The article puts forward the use of evidence
lineups to protect fingerprint experts from contextual infor-
mation. In two experiments, novice fingerprint evaluators
used the filler-control procedure (i.e., six fingerprints to
compare to the crime sample) for matching fingerprints.
Compared to the standard procedure (i.e., comparing a
single print to a crime print), the filler-control procedure
successfully reduced false alarms, even when the finger-
prints were too ambiguous to reach a conclusion. The latter
is important because ambiguity is known to increase reli-
ance on biased and heuristic thinking (e.g., Ask, Rebelius,
& Granhag, 2008; Neth & Gigerenzer, 2015).
Sauerland, Otgaar, Maegherman, and Sagana (2020) dis-
cuss the role of the expert witness in court and highlight the
dangers that lie within the practice of appointing experts by
the defense and the prosecution. In a series of three experi-
ments, Sauerland et al. exposed the ease with which bias
can be induced and the difficulties with its elimination.
Specifically, participants were appointed as expert witness
either from the defense or from the prosecution and
received an appointment letter that emphasized the argu-
ments of the retaining party. This simple manipulation
was sufficient to steer participants’ case evaluations to
adhere with the party that retained them, namely to induce
allegiance bias. Eliminating the bias, however, proved diffi-
cult. Neither two-sided instructions nor pre-constructed
alternative scenarios were effective.
The last article in this category touches upon the ability
of attorneys to recognize when bias has tainted the interpre-
tation of forensic evidence. Attorneys are expected to iden-
tify risks that could jeopardise their clients’ interests, but
their role in detecting forensic bias has largely been
neglected in today’s literature. Despodova, Kukucka, and
Hiley (2020) took on this understudied topic by assessing
whether defense attorneys can detect if an autopsy report
from a medical examiner had been tainted by knowledge
of the defendant’s recanted confession. Defense attorneys
appeared insensitive to the possibility of biased forensic
reporting. In light of these findings, the authors call for pro-
cedural reforms to assist the efforts in reducing forensic
confirmation bias.
The next group of articles adds to the ongoing discussion
about interdependencies in the evaluation of forensic
evidence. Two papers are devoted to this topic. Tersago,
Vanderhallen, Rozie, and McIntyre (2020) analyzed crim-
inal case files and conducted semi-structured interviews
with criminal judges to explore how judges determine
the admissibility and validity of a suspect’s statement
(confession vs. denial) in burglary cases. Specifically, they
assessed the extent to which judges (a) took into account
the process through which a statement was obtained when
judging its value and (b) determined the probative value of
the suspect’s statement through a comparison with other
evidence. In line with earlier work, the findings support
the pervasive influence of confessions. How a confession
was obtained was not essential for judges’ evidence
evaluation. Rather, confessions indiscriminately led to con-
victions, even when the confession was inconsistent with
other pieces of evidence and even though judges reported
doubting the credibility of confessions in interviews.
Sanson, Crozier, and Strange (2020) show how contextual
influences and other evidence, even when nonprobative,
impact the assessment of scientific claims. Their contribu-
tion examined the courtroom as a contextual factor in jud-
ging the accuracy of forensic science claims. Indeed, the
courtroom setting – as well as source expertise – increased
the perceived credibility of forensic science claims. The
credibility of the claims further increased in the presence
of non-probative photos. Because the courtroom is a con-
stant contextual influence in civil and criminal cases, Sanson
et al. emphasize the need for safeguards in the justice sys-
tem to ensure that forensic claims made in court are true.
The last category of articles deals with the cognitive and
behavioral changes that the knowledge of and beliefs about
evidence might generate. The article of Jang, Luke,
Granhag, and Vrij (2020) deals with the early steps of the
criminal investigation. Jang et al. examined how type of
evidence influenced police investigators’ beliefs about the
reliability of incriminating evidence and the likelihood of
the suspect to be the perpetrator. The findings speak to
the issue of the perceived reliability of forensic evidence
and go a step further in showing that such beliefs can have
a direct and immediate impact on investigators’ presump-
tion of innocence.
Goodman-Delahunty and Martschuk (2020) examined
how admissible incriminating evidence of uncharged prior
transgressions can influence jurors’ perceptions of criminal
intent (mens rea) and report findings of a large experimental
jury simulation project. Although prejudicial evidence
increased the perception of criminal intent, this evidence
did not lead juries to lower their threshold of proof or to
engage in impermissible reasoning. This is in contrast to
the popular belief that admissible incriminating evidence
of uncharged acts is unfairly prejudicial, leading the authors
to conclude that the risk of undue prejudice from evidence
of prior sexual misconduct might be exaggerated.
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The issue closes with an opinion paper addressing the
disconnect between the empirical work in legal decision-
making and the current legal practice. Specifically, Sagana
and van Toor (2020) argue that this disconnect stems from
the limited consideration of procedural rules in empirical
studies. This in turn increases the skepticism of legal
scholars and practitioners of this research and serves as
an excuse for dismissing empirical evidence. The paper
takes a broader approach to bias in legal decision-making
and reflects on issues in the assessment of forensic
evidence. The authors close with a call for a collaborative
approach between (legal) decision-making researchers
and legal scholars in the form of empirical legal studies.
Concluding Remarks
This special issue reaches out to researchers and practi-
tioners alike and aspires to generate a dialogue between
all players involved in the investigation and evaluation of
forensic evidence, including forensic experts, attorneys, jur-
ors, and judges. Indeed, most of the studies in this special
issue highlight the need for maximizing safeguards and
the importance of proper training among forensic experts
and legal practitioners. This can best be accomplished
when representatives from different disciplines and profes-
sions, law and psychology, research and practice, form
allegiances.
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